Propelling and navigating South Korea’s space ambitionsby Jennifer Hong Whetsell and Seokjin Yun
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| Seoul is signaling a decisive shift toward integrating space into its broader goals for technological innovation, economic growth, and national security. |
This article begins by examining the strategic context driving South Korea’s expanding space ambitions and the institutional reforms that are reshaping its approach to space. It then provides an in-depth assessment of two flagship projects: the KSLV-III rocket and the Korean Positioning System (KPS) satellite constellation. Both are key to elevating South Korea’s standing in the international space arena, yet each face distinct technological and bureaucratic challenges. For the KSLV-III, the transition to a public-private partnership model has been hindered by intellectual property disputes and the recent pivot toward reusable, methane-based engines. The KPS project grapples with project management inefficiencies and design setbacks that threaten to delay deployment. There are also growing calls to expand the system’s scope: adopting a more ambitious multi-orbital architecture to counter regional security threats and advance commercial applications. This article concludes by exploring how South Korea is responding to these hurdles: through bold technical revisions, governance reforms to better manage civil and commercial actors, and a more proactive role in shaping international norms and partnerships.
Asia is emerging as the forefront of the modern space race, and South Korea is determined to lead it. South Korea’s pursuit of indigenous space capabilities has evolved from a Cold War-era security necessity into a multifaceted national strategy that integrates defense, technological innovation, and economic development. Historically constrained by missile range guidelines established in the 1970s and its accession to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2001, South Korea faced limits on domestic rocket development and collaboration with non-MTCR countries. Today, those constraints have become overly prohibitive, as Seoul views sovereign space capabilities as vital to deterring North Korea’s military threats, expanding regional influence, and gaining a competitive edge in the global space economy.
International space competition is fierce, with countries racing to advance key technologies such as positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); satellite communications; and Earth observation. These advancements are expected to fuel massive economic growth, with projections estimating the global space economy could reach $1.8 trillion by 2035, more than triple its 2023 value. South Korea aims to position itself among the top five global space powers by 2045 by aligning its space ambitions with leadership in AI, semiconductors, and next-generation telecommunications. Simultaneously, Seoul is leveraging space collaboration to strengthen its alliance with the United States and bolster its regional standing. The establishment of the Korea Aerospace Administration (KASA) in 2024 marks a turning point, establishing a centralized authority to coordinate research and development (R&D), space policy, international engagement, and industrial partnerships. This institutional consolidation supports ambitious goals such as landing spacecraft on the Moon by 2032 and on Mars by 2045.
South Korea believes that two landmark projects are crucial in achieving these objectives: the next-generation KSLV-III rocket (KSLV: Korea Space Launch Vehicle) and the Korean Positioning System (KPS) constellation, both led by the government-funded Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). However, as South Korea strives to keep pace with rapid technological innovation, it must overcome the challenge of integrating commercial actors into its traditionally state-dominated rocket development program, while also managing the complex demands of large-scale, civilian-led programs like KPS. This moment will serve as a critical test of KASA’s ability to foster effective public-private partnerships and demonstrate robust project management and institutional oversight: capabilities that will define the next phase of South Korea’s ascent in space.
South Korea’s recent success of the Nuri (KSLV-II) rocket, making it the latest nation to achieve independent orbital launch capability, has raised expectations for its emergence as a potential regional space hub for Asia. This milestone comes at a time when the region is benefiting from the “democratization” of space—a trend marked by lower barriers to launch and satellite operations, which has enabled new countries and commercial players to participate in space activities that were once limited to global superpowers. Yet, South Korea’s rockets still have a long way to go to become economically competitive. Compared to regional peers like Japan, China, and India, whose space programs began decades earlier, South Korea remains a relative latecomer. It now faces the challenge of catching up just as Asia’s space sector is experiencing rapid transformation driven by technological advancements and increasing commercial space activities.
| Decades of dependence on foreign partners, compounded by export controls and shifting geopolitical alliances, have underscored the risks of relying on others for access to space. |
To establish itself as a collaborative leader in Asia’s evolving commercial space ecosystem, South Korea must develop a globally competitive and commercially viable launch sector. Japan’s trajectory in commercial space launch offers a compelling blueprint. In 2012, Japan conducted its very first commercial launch of a foreign satellite: South Korea’s KOMPSAT-3, a multipurpose Earth observation satellite, aboard the H-IIA rocket. That launch marked Japan’s entry into the competitive commercial launch market and was followed by broader cooperation with regional partners, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, through technology transfer and data-sharing initiatives. In contrast, as a latecomer to the market, South Korea has so far focused primarily on using its rocket launches for technology validation and has yet to launch a foreign payload as of 2025.
Capturing a share of the growing commercial space market will require lowering launch costs through innovation, particularly via reusable rockets and innovative fuels that can carry heavier payloads. These innovations have allowed companies like SpaceX to achieve economies of scale in low Earth orbit (LEO), or below 2,000 kilometers, which has become the focal point of commercial expansion due to its relative accessibility and affordability. Lower launch costs are not just fueling satellite deployments, but are also laying the groundwork for the coming “space-for-space” economy, where demand for orbital infrastructure—habitats, labs, factories—will soar. However, access to higher-value orbits, such as geosynchronous orbits (about 35,786 kilometers) and lunar transfer orbits, requires significantly more powerful rockets with greater payload capacity.
Despite progress, South Korea’s space ambitions face persistent structural challenges rooted in geography and economics. The country’s high-latitude launch site lacks the equatorial boost that countries closer to the Equator enjoy, which provides fuel efficiency via the Earth’s rotational speed. Additionally, South Korea’s geographic proximity to densely populated neighboring countries, such as China, Japan, and the Philippines, restricts launch angles, requiring careful trajectory planning to avoid potential debris fallout. To overcome these constraints, South Korea must invest heavily in propulsion technologies and precision engineering: investments that carry uncertain commercial returns. Some experts suggest that instead of prioritizing independent launch capabilities, South Korea should focus on complementing the space activities of established partners like the United States and Japan, which could offer more immediate returns and strengthen Seoul’s role within the broader regional and global space ecosystem.
Nevertheless, the drive for autonomous launch capabilities runs deep in South Korea’s history and strategic outlook, rooted in the country’s broader experience of navigating security challenges and asserting national sovereignty. Decades of dependence on foreign partners, compounded by export controls and shifting geopolitical alliances, have underscored the risks of relying on others for access to space. Notably, during the development of KSLV-I, South Korea relied heavily on Russian technology and launch services, but this partnership was abruptly severed following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022. That rupture highlighted the fragility of external arrangements and reaffirmed the strategic logic of sovereign launch capabilities. By mastering independent access to space, Seoul aims to make its own security decisions, safeguard critical satellite infrastructure, and deploy assets without bottlenecks in foreign launch services.
Yet, South Korea’s technological edge risks dulling as the Nuri (KSLV-II) rocket’s launch cadence slows to a crawl. Although Nuri’s third launch in 2023 marked a historical milestone, the fourth launch is not scheduled until November 2025, marking a 2.5-year gap. This sluggish pace threatens to erode hard-won technical expertise, as engineers and private firms struggle to maintain specialized workforces and institutional knowledge in the absence of consistent launch activities. In the global space launch market, momentum is critical; extended intervals between missions can sap both confidence and capital, jeopardizing future viability.
This challenge becomes more acute as South Korea eyes the next leap to the KSLV-III rocket. Outlined in the country’s Fourth Space Development Promotion Plan (2022), the KSLV-III is intended to triple LEO payload capacity and enable a domestically developed lunar lander mission by 2032. The plan also envisions public-private partnerships to transfer launch capabilities to the commercial sector, reflecting a global pivot from state-led civil space programs to commercially driven ventures.
| Without a faster launch cadence, a robust framework for public-private collaboration, and a clear path to economic competitiveness, Seoul risks being left behind—not just in the race for the Moon, but in the broader contest to shape the future of space. |
But the transition to a public-private model is already testing the limits of South Korea’s space ecosystem. KSLV-III’s development has gotten off to a rocky start, as relations between KARI and Hanwha Aerospace—the defense industry powerhouse contracted to lead system integration—have soured due to an intellectual property (IP) rights dispute. Hanhwa, citing its significant financial and technical investment in Korea's next-generation launch vehicle program, has advocated for joint IP ownership, while KARI insists that exclusive rights belong to the public sector due to government funding.
These dynamics unfold as the international space landscape continues to evolve. In the US, debates over whether to prioritize the Moon or Mars in human exploration have resurfaced. At the fourth US-Korea Civil Space Dialogue in April 2024, joint goals for Moon and Mars exploration were discussed explicitly, underscoring the pressure on Seoul to keep pace with its partners and competitors alike. Seoul’s own timeline to reach the Moon looks increasingly tight, especially as the global conversation shifts toward Mars and beyond. Without a faster launch cadence, a robust framework for public-private collaboration, and a clear path to economic competitiveness, Seoul risks being left behind—not just in the race for the Moon, but in the broader contest to shape the future of space.
Starting from 2025, Hanhwa Aerospace will assume systems integrator responsibilities from KARI for Nuri’s fourth launch, marking a pivotal step in South Korea’s shift toward a public-private partnership model in space. This move signals a broader effort to accelerate the nation’s launch schedule and build commercial capacity. KASA has already committed to ramping up launch frequency, pledging to increase the number of missions beyond the planned sixth launch in 2027 to as many as nine launches by 2030, aiming for at least one launch per year.
Government support for expanded Nuri operations is also growing. The Korean Ministry of Defense recently proposed using Nuri to deploy two additional military satellites, which would further increase demand and solidify the rocket’s role in national security. This strong institutional backing is promising, but it also highlights the need to carefully coordinate the transition to commercial leadership. Ongoing debates within KASA reflect this tension, particularly over whether future launches should be managed through formal contracts rather than relying on KASA’s discretionary budget, which could strain other agency projects. These discussions highlight the differing priorities between bureaucratic actors, who emphasize national objectives, and personnel with private sector backgrounds, who prioritize commercial sustainability and long-term market viability.
Ultimately, the success of Nuri’s upcoming fourth through sixth launches will be crucial not only for demonstrating the rocket’s reliability but also for bridging the gap between public and private stakeholders and advancing a unified, sustainable vision for South Korea’s space future.
At the same time, KASA has also been cautiously dipping its toes into the world of reusable rockets. In September 2024, the agency announced initial plans for a lightweight reusable rocket capable of delivering 500 kilograms to LEO, separate from the heavier, single-use KSLV-III. While a reusable engine would be a major achievement, the proposal drew criticism for lacking the payload capacity of the heavy-lift, reusable rockets that increasingly dominate the global market. In a significant policy shift, the Third National Space Council in February 2025 greenlit design changes to the KSLV-III, formally integrating reusability into South Korea’s national space transportation strategy. The program has now pivoted from improving Nuri’s kerosene-based engines to developing a reusable methane-powered launch vehicle.
However, this shift introduces new risks. In April, the Ministry of Science and Information and Communication Technology determined that the proposed methane-based redesign did not meet the criteria for a “special evaluation,” a streamlined approval process for plan modifications. As a result, KASA was required to submit the project for a full feasibility reassessment through the Ministry of Economy and Finance, a more rigorous and time-consuming process that may take six to nine months to complete.
| The evolution of the Nuri program, the contested development of KSLV-III, and the ambitious pivot toward reusable methane-based rockets reflect a nation trying to redefine its space identity amid growing international stakes. |
The situation is further complicated by the ongoing intellectual property dispute between Hanhwa Aerospace and KARI. To bridge the conflict, KASA launched an internal review in October 2024 to explore models for intellectual property sharing and agreements based on international best practices. Although KASA had previously promised to establish clear guidelines by September 2025, the recent shift to reusability may deepen the rift between KARI and Hanhwa. That company has expressed interest in participating in the revised KSLV-III design, but these changes may prompt a new round of bidding, inviting fresh competition from others, including Korean aerospace giant Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). Notably, KAI previously withdrew from the KSLV-III bid to focus on its own reusable rockets, but the KSLV-III’s new objectives could change its strategic calculus. As a result, all research and development activities have effectively paused.
Despite the challenges, South Korea is not alone in facing growing pains as it builds a vibrant commercial space sector. A useful parallel can be found in NASA’s experience in the early 2000s, when the agency faced contractor disputes over resupply missions to the International Space Station. Kistler Aerospace initially secured the contract in 2004, but SpaceX—then a relatively unknown startup—successfully contested the decision through a Government Accountability Office complaint. NASA’s response was to start the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program in 2006, which tied funding to technical milestones and helped foster a thriving US commercial launch sector KASA is now trying to emulate a similar commercial model as it advances its next-generation launch systems. To succeed, it must overcome critical challenges in governance, public-private collaboration, and industrial scalability. The evolution of the Nuri program, the contested development of KSLV-III, and the ambitious pivot toward reusable methane-based rockets reflect a nation trying to redefine its space identity amid growing international stakes. South Korea must maintain momentum, cohesion, and stakeholder alignment to realize its space ambitions and secure a lasting role in the emerging space order.
The Korea Positioning System (KPS) stands as another flagship project, designed to provide regional satellite navigation coverage akin to Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and India’s NavIC. Once operational, KPS will offer secure, independent, and highly precise positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services across the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand.
KPS is engineered to offer significant technological advantages to the long-standing US Global Positioning System (GPS). In South Korea, today’s GPS accuracy can deviate by as much as 20 meters, making it insufficient for next-generation applications like autonomous vehicles, urban air mobility (UAM), and automated ports. By integrating KPS with GPS, positioning accuracy could be improved to as little as 2.5 centimeters, unlocking new markets for innovative, navigation-dependent industries.
Security concerns are equally central to KPS’s development. North Korea’s frequent GPS jamming campaigns have exposed the risks of overdependence on foreign systems. KPS is being developed to supplement US signals, a critical capability for military operations in South Korea’s mountainous terrain and dense urban environments, where signal degradation is a constant risk. KPS will also play a crucial role in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the Indo-Pacific, an area that depends on integrated communication, surveillance, and navigation capabilities. By providing enhanced navigation services, KPS can significantly strengthen MDA efforts not only for Korea but also for other countries in the region.
| Security concerns are equally central to KPS’s development. North Korea’s frequent GPS jamming campaigns have exposed the risks of overdependence on foreign systems. |
Despite its strategic promise, KPS has encountered significant setbacks. A critical “design failure” during the preliminary design review had delayed the program by approximately 20 months, pushing the expected launch from 2027 to 2029. Although KASA has promised to meet its original deadline of finishing the constellation by 2035, criticism has mounted over the agency’s project management. Observers have pointed to a lack of a dedicated project manager, limited multi-agency coordination experience, and insufficient oversight mechanisms as key shortcomings.
Beyond the timeline concerns, experts have questioned whether the KPS architecture is sufficiently ambitious. The current plan includes eight satellites—three in GEO and five in inclined GEO, all positioned approximately 36,000 kilometers above Earth. However, repeated jamming of GPS signals, which have disrupted civilian aviation and maritime activity, has prompted calls for additional navigation satellites in LEO. Such navigation satellites, operating at around 500 kilometers, would provide stronger, more resilient signals, enhancing both commercial and military applications, from indoor drones and UAMs flying through tunnels to military operations in trenches.
Despite these setbacks, South Korea now has a strategic opportunity to reform its organizational approach to space programs and develop a comprehensive strategy to meet its broader objectives.
One immediate step is the restructuring of the KPS. Responsibility for KPS is being shifted from an independent project team to direct oversight by the KARI administrator, which could help solve stove-piping and improve coordination across KARI divisions and with industrial stakeholders. Although independent teams were originally created to shield projects from frequent leadership changes—KARI administrators rotate every three years—this structure has resulted in long-standing problems of accountability and integration, also evident in the Nuri rocket program.
While the 20-month delay in KPS development will likely slow strategic timelines, it also provides South Korea with space to reassess its ambitions. In response, KASA’s 2025 Satellite Strategy outlines plans for a feasibility study on a multi-orbital PNT system, including LEO satellites, with a test launch targeted for 2035. This signals a willingness to pursue more resilient and scalable solutions beyond the current GEO and inclined GEO constellation designs.
In the meantime, South Korea is deepening its operational partnership with the United States to bridge capability gaps, especially as reliance on the US GPS system remains critical. However, the challenges facing KPS extend beyond hardware delays. Equally important is the need to develop the human and institutional expertise required to operate and seamlessly integrate space assets into joint military command-and-control structures. Although the US-ROK alliance has long enabled joint operations, effective space-domain integration is a relatively new frontier that demands specialized expertise, from satellite operations to data fusion and secure communications. This close cooperation with the United States is cultivating a nuanced understanding of shared threats and strengthening both diplomatic and operational awareness.
Most importantly, South Korea is gaining invaluable hands-on experience as it works to build its own autonomous space operations capabilities and to utilize KPS as a cornerstone for national security in the years ahead. Increased exposure to US space operations and coordinated responses to PNT attacks is helping South Korea develop a deeper understanding of the risks involved, along with the technical and human expertise required for effective space operations. These joint exercises provide practical training in detecting and responding to space threats while also fostering expertise in satellite command-and-control, rapid decision-making under pressure, and secure data transmission. South Korea can refine the design, operational procedures, and security protocols of KPS, ensuring the system is robust and resilient. Not only does this strengthen the alliance’s collective response capabilities, but it also empowers Seoul with the expertise and confidence necessary to independently develop, deploy, and operate an autonomous PNT system for military use.
| Ultimately, KPS represents far more than a technical upgrade: it is a foundational capability for Korea’s national security, economic competitiveness, and future presence in both terrestrial and lunar space domains. |
A key driver of this operational integration is South Korea’s growing partnership with US Space Forces Korea (SPACEFOR-KOR), established in 2022 to embed space-domain expertise within the alliance. In 2025, two major joint exercises were especially noteworthy. In March, SPACEFOR-KOR became the first US component command to conduct a full-scale Polaris Hammer exercise, an exercise to enable component field commands to practice operational planning, refine command-and-control procedures, and clarify command relationships. Held alongside the annual Freedom Shield exercise with participation from South Korean Air Force personnel, this event centered on integrating space capabilities to advance Korean theater campaign objectives and developing streamlined operational processes to enable seamless interoperability between US and Korean forces.
Complementing these advancements, the Polaris Lynx joint tabletop exercise held in May addressed North Korea’s evolving space threats by focusing on deterring jamming and preparing for future hostile satellite maneuvers targeting GPS infrastructure. During the event, both sides analyzed recent GPS jamming incidents and hostile satellite maneuver scenarios to refine diplomatic and military countermeasures, preparing for present and emerging dangers to PNT systems.
Beyond the US-ROK alliance, international cooperation represents an underutilized avenue for advancing South Korea’s space agenda. One important venue for such collaboration is the United Nations’ International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG), which brings together countries and organizations to coordinate the world’s major satellite navigation systems. Within the ICG, the Providers’ Forum serves as the main platform for coordinating compatibility and interoperability among the world’s global navigation satellite system (GNSS) providers.
In 2025, South Korea may join the Providers Forum, aiming to stand alongside the United States, China, the EU, Russia, India, and Japan. Membership would ensure South Korea has a direct voice in shaping GNSS signal standards and helping to secure its place in the competitive GNSS landscape. Although no consensus was reached regarding South Korea’s 2024 membership request, hosting the 2025 Annual Meeting of the ICG this October in Busan offers a prime opportunity to build momentum and demonstrate effective international space policy leadership, perhaps securing entrée to the Providers Forum in the process.
The meeting comes at a pivotal moment in GNSS governance, as the focus expands to lunar PNT services—essential for everything from robotic and human surface operations to broader lunar infrastructure. The ICG recommended establishing a fifth Working Group, Working Group-Lunar (WG-L), to support interoperable, compatible, and accessible lunar PNT systems. Recent demonstrations, such as the February 2025 LuGRE experiment, have shown that existing constellations like GPS and Europe’s Galileo can be adapted for lunar navigation. The United States, EU, and Japan are already collaborating on the Lunar Augmented Navigation Service (LANS) under the LunaNet framework, aimed at supporting interoperable robotic and human surface operations on the Moon. KASA has expressed interest in joining these efforts and is conducting preliminary research on a Korea Lunar Positioning System (LPS) that could extend KPS capabilities to the cislunar environment.
Ultimately, KPS represents far more than a technical upgrade: it is a foundational capability for Korea’s national security, economic competitiveness, and future presence in both terrestrial and lunar space domains. KASA’s effectiveness as the lead agency for research, development, and international engagement in this project is now being tested. With ongoing project management challenges, delays, and an evolving North Korean threat, KASA must manage internal stakeholder cohesion, accelerate development of multi-orbital architectures, and seize diplomatic opportunities, such as the 2025 ICG meeting, to shape the evolving norms of global and lunar navigation governance.
South Korea’s space program stands at a pivotal crossroads. The country has achieved notable milestones, becoming one of the few countries with independent orbital launch capabilities and advancing flagship initiatives like the KSLV-III and KPS systems. Yet, sustaining this progress will require addressing a range of systemic challenges, including technical delays, interagency friction, and questions about commercial readiness. As KASA works to modernize its governance structures, develop reusable launch technologies, and deepen international partnerships, the imperative is clear: ambitions must be matched by timely and effective execution.
Encouragingly, South Korea’s relatively late entry into the commercial space race offers a distinct advantage. Unencumbered by legacy systems or entrenched industrial practices, the country is well-positioned to leapfrog older models and learn from the experiences of others. As a result, Seoul is better positioned to adapt to the dramatic technological and geopolitical shifts now reshaping the global space sector. The decisions made in this formative decade will determine not only South Korea’s role in the space economy but also its capacity to shape the emerging international order beyond Earth.
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