The dilemma of space weaponizationby Ajey Lele
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| The recent US announcement that it has deployed weapons in orbit is a significant departure from the self-constrained approach followed so far. |
On September 14, Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink stated at a conference that the United States has deployed weapons in space and would use them to defend the country and its forces, if required. He argued that the US needs such capabilities in orbit to signal to potential adversaries that it is prepared to respond to hostile actions in the space domain. The deployment supposedly provides the US with on-orbit space-control capabilities. The US administration has not disclosed the nature or capabilities of these weapons, but considers their deployment an important step towards establishing deterrence in space. The US has chosen not to disclose the nature of these weapons, arguing that doing so would compromise the element of surprise and potentially weaken their deterrent value.
For several years, concerns over the prospect of warfare reaching outer space have been growing. There are major concerns regarding the development of counterspace capabilities by China and Russia. The US is also known to be simultaneously developing such capabilities. Along with that, the US established the US Space Force as a separate military service in 2019. Obviously, one of the major considerations for this was the various challenges posed by Russia and China in the space domain. However, despite the growing military competition among the three major powers, none had openly acknowledged the deployment of weapons in space. Some degree of strategic restraint was in place since there was a realization about the potentially destabilizing consequences of crossing the red line.
However, the recent US announcement that it has deployed weapons in orbit is a significant departure from the self-constrained approach followed so far. Possibly, the US no longer wants any ambiguity in this regard. This clearly indicates that they want to establish a space deterrence mechanism. This move is bound to push some other powers to respond accordingly. The US decision denotes an important turning point in the evolution of space security and is likely to have implications for the future character of warfare, particularly in space. This move is much of a concern since it could contribute to greater military competition in outer space and even start an arms race in space. The US is setting a dangerous precedent that could ultimately prove detrimental to global peace and the sustainable use of outer space.
Actually, the US had an option to avoid putting any weapons is space. For this purpose, they could have followed the path of arms control and disarmament. Interestingly, it was an initiative pushed by Russia (supported by China) that was giving them an opportunity. UNGA Resolution 69/32, “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”, also known as PPWT, was adopted on December 2, 2014, with 126 votes in favor, 4 against, and 46 abstentions.
It was a significant step towards strengthening international attention to space security and the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). The willingness of UN member states to pursue initiatives aimed at creating a more secure and sustainable space environment was clearly evident. However, the US showed little interest in the resolution. This could be viewed as a missed opportunity, as greater US engagement with the resolution might have contributed to delaying the potential weaponization of outer space, now sure if it could have stopped it totally.
Arms control and disarmament initiatives may at times appear constrained by geopolitical interests and even by hypocrisy among states. However, they continue to retain considerable relevance in the contemporary international system. UN resolutions can influence state behavior and gradually contribute to greater international acceptance of the norms and principles they promote. Many experts argue that Russia and China possess significant counterspace capabilities. However, broader acceptance of UNGA Resolution 69/32 could, at the very least, have contributed to greater restraint against placing weapons in outer space. But it is unfortunate that the UN Security Council P5 group is deeply divided between Western nations and the China-Russia partnership. This is causing political gridlock on global issues, with space security one such victim of the impasse.
| Is US space deterrence a viable defense strategy, or has the US moved too quickly towards deploying weapons in space? |
Now, the US confession that it has placed weapons in space is likely to undermine the emerging normative framework and potentially open a Pandora’s box, encouraging other states to follow suit. Technically, the US has not broken any treaty obligations. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) is bans the testing of any weapons of mass destruction in space and does not explicitly ban conventional or non-kinetic weapons in space. There is a possibility the US could have placed in orbit systems like space-based jammers and electronic warfare systems as “weapons.”
Particularly since the 1991 Gulf War, armed forces around the world have increasingly integrated space-based technologies into both peacetime and wartime processes. Satellites are used for weather monitoring; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; navigation; communications; and missile warning. There is broad international recognition that the military use of space-based technologies alone does not constitute the weaponization of outer space and is generally compatible with existing international law and norms. Such capabilities primarily serve as force multipliers for armed forces. In contract, weaponization of space is about development, deployment, or use of capabilities intended to threaten, harm, or destroy the space assets of adversaries, either in space or on ground.
Is US space deterrence a viable defense strategy, or has the US moved too quickly towards deploying weapons in space without first giving adequate consideration to developing and establishing the concept of space deterrence as a coherent strategic framework? It is important to critically assess whether space deterrence can function as an independent strategic construct. Given the evolving nature of the space domain, future theorists and policymakers will need to examine its conceptual foundations, credibility, limitations, and practical applicability of this idea. Today, there is no strategic framework available in this regard.
This is not to argue that deterrence has no role in space domain, but it has not been properly discussed. Rocket science and nuclear science are fundamentally different domains, and the strategic logic of nuclear deterrence cannot simply be juxtaposed to outer space. Nuclear deterrence works because nuclear weapons can threaten a state’s survival and invite massive retaliation. Space systems are becoming increasingly important in supporting human life and socioeconomic development. The civilian applications of space far exceed their military uses. At the same time, losing satellites can be serious but itself is not generally not an existential threat to a state.
Traditional models like Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) are not going to be effective for space domain. It has been often said that there is “no Mahan for space,” since even today the space domain has no unifying doctrine and the current international relations debate in this regard remains fragmented and inconclusive. Against the backdrop, it could be said that the existing logic for space deterrence is inadequate.
It may now be only a matter of time before China and Russia also begin placing weapons in space, if they have not done so already. They are unlikely to continue pushing for negotiations on their pet mechanisms such as the PPWT with the same emphasis. The UN’s Open-Ended Working Group discussion will have to take these emerging realities into account. In such an environment, existing and future efforts to develop codes of conduct, rules of the road, and mechanisms such as transparency and confidence-building measures could lose much of their relevance and effectiveness.
The US action is likely to increase the risks of space warfare and could also contribute to normalizing the idea that outer space is simply another domain of warfighting. Space assets are difficult to defend; vulnerabilities would be mostly asymmetric and challenges such as attribution can complicate any response. For the US, China and Russia may be the most obvious strategic challenges. But what is the guarantee that additional challenges will not emerge as the number of space actors continues to grow, including from private space companies with increasingly sophisticated capabilities? States such as North Korea and Iran could also seek to exploit emerging vulnerabilities in the space domain. Once momentum towards a space arms race begins, it could become difficult to reverse, potentially making outer space an unstable security environment.
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